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Abstract 
A firm can obtain market power through its dominant position on the product market, or via control of a key 
resource. In particular, it has been argued that airport dominance is a more important source of market power in 
the US airline industry than route dominance. We examine this contention by analyzing a seventeen-year panel of 
airport-level prices in the United States. We demonstrate that even though on average airport-level concentration 
appears to be the strongest source of market power, concentration on routes originating at an airport is the 
strongest predictor of price levels for the sub-set of large and medium hub airports. There is little evidence that 
either airport or route dominance significantly affect prices in the sub-sample of medium and small hub airports. 
There is also little evidence that an airport’s dominant carrier exerts market power beyond the level predicted by 
the airport or route dominance. Our results imply that consumer welfare losses due to airline consolidation can be 
concentrated in smaller communities, and related to changes in airport-level concentration. We provide a simple 
evaluation of the possible effects of two recent and one projected mergers (Delta – Northwest, United – 
Continental, and American – US Airways) in light of this finding, and suggest that the former consolidation event 
can potentially lead to non-trivial consumer welfare losses to travelers in over 30 small communities. 
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I. Introduction 
This study takes a 30,000-feet view at the issue of sources of market power in the US airline industry. 
We take a fairly straightforward approach. Consider a passenger contemplating a trip that originates at a 
local airport. The question we ask is: will this passenger pay a higher price, other things equal, if his local 
airport is served by a few airlines, or if there is little competition on the individual markets originating at 
this airport? Alternatively, the question we are asking can be formulated in this way: will trips 
originating at an airport served by only two airlines that compete on each market originating from this 
gateway be priced higher than tickets for flights, originating at an airport served by four airlines, where 
each carrier is a monopolist on the respective routes it serves? Additionally, we inquire whether ticket 
prices will be higher if one of the carriers serving the airport has a dominant position at this gateway, 
meaning that it carries most of the passengers out of and into the airport. In other words, we examine 
the role airport dominance, airport concentration, and route concentration play in determining the 
prices for airline tickets originating at a particular airport. 
While the commonly held view is that airfares are determined solely by the competition at the individual 
market level; we can suggest the following rationales for the airport-level concentration to affect 
average fares for trips originating at an airport, irrespective of whether the airlines compete head-to-
head on individual non-stop routes originating at the airport. First, airlines operating hub-and-spoke 
networks will inevitably compete on one-stop routes that originate at the airport, flying passengers to 
the same destinations via different hubs. Second, airlines enjoying dominant position at an airport can 
influence airport decision making, including blocking further entry (Berry, 1990). Third, airlines’ entry 
into an airport can be construed by incumbent carriers as a competitive threat, affecting fares on routes 
not directly served by the entrant (Goolsbee and Syverson, 2008). Finally, we can expect airlines at less 
concentrated airports to compete more aggressively for frequent fliers residing in the airport’s 
catchment area This expectation is drawn from Borenstein’s (1989) original suggestion that frequent 
flier programs could be a source behind the observed hub premium. 
While research on pricing in the US airline industry has been extensive, a simple question of the 
interplay of airport and route dominance has not been examined across the entire industry and over 
time. Most studies to date have either focused on a limited number of markets, or examined the issue of 
sources of market power over relatively short time periods. As a result, for instance, little is known 
about the sources of market power at small airports. Further, a simple question of the relationship 
between price and airport concentration has been overlooked in the literature, as researchers have 
focused on estimating market power of the dominant airline at an airport. Our study starts filling these 
gaps. 
We have constructed a seventeen-year long panel of airport-level average airfares for domestic trips 
originating at all US airports, using the data collected by the US Department of Transportation (DOT). 
We have then used a different DOT dataset to construct measures of concentration, at both airport level 
and for the routes with non-stop services originating at the airport. Applying conventional panel data 
analysis techniques, and accounting for endogeneity of the key market concentration variables, we 
determine that, on average, airport concentration stands out as the most important driver of airport-
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level fares. The size of the effect is however not impressive: a 10 percent increase in airport-level HHI 
only raises the average fares by 1 to 1.8 percent. Further analysis reveals that the airport concentration-
price relationship is primarily driven by small airports. Data analysis for large and medium hubs (airports 
that have traditionally been the focus of hub dominance premium studies) reveals route dominance as 
the primary source of market power: coefficient estimates suggest that a 10-percent increase in mean 
HHI for non-stop routes originating from such airports increases average airfares by around 7 percent. 
We also find sporadic evidence suggesting that increase in the market share of the largest airline in the 
airport may increase airfares. 
Our research has implications, in particular, for analyzing effects of mergers in the airline industry. 
Recent debates over this important issue have focused on addressing the question of the impact of 
mergers on airfares via changes in the route-level competition (Brueckner, Lee, and Singer, forthcoming). 
We show that analyzing effects of airline consolidation on airport-level concentration is also important. 
Specifically, our analysis shows that the Delta-Northwest merger is projected to substantially increase 
concentration at about three times as many airports as the Continental-United merger. The projected 
American-US Airways merger is projected to increase airport-level concentration in a number of 
otherwise not concentrated medium and large hub airports. We further demonstrate that the Delta-
Northwest merger can potentially lead to about a quarter of a billion dollars per year in terms of 
consumer welfare losses through increased airport-level concentration at around thirty small airports. 
More generally, we suggest that gains and losses from airline consolidation may not be distributed 
evenly across the US airline industry; and in particular losses from consolidation could be 
disproportionately borne by smaller communities. 
The rest of the study is organized as follows. The next section reviews the relevant literature, followed 
by the description of the data and discussion of the analysis methodology. After this, data analysis 
results are presented and discussed, paying specific attention at the implications of our exercise for 
analysis of the airline mergers. The last section of the paper offers some concluding remarks. 
II. Relevant Literature 
Looking at the rather extensive literature on the sources of market power in the US airline industry, two 
stylized facts stand out. First, low-cost carriers, in particular Southwest Airlines, push average fares 
down on the routes they enter. Second, airport dominance appears to play an important role as a source 
of market power; perhaps more important than the route dominance. These facts reflect the focus of 
the empirical studies on low cost carriers and – to a larger extent – hub operators, which typically 
dominate the airports they serve. This focus is understandable, as emergence of hub-and-spoke 
networks and explosive growth of low-cost carriers have been the two most important innovations in 
the airline industry since deregulation. The path along which the literature developed has, however, led 
to the following important gaps, which our study intends to start filling. First, airport-concentration-
price relationship has received substantially less attention than the dominant-carrier’s-market-share-
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price correlation3. Second, smaller airports, which are as likely to be dominated by a single carrier, 
received little coverage. Third, aggregate level studies examining the issue of sources of market power 
over longer time periods are scarce: a recent paper (Borenstein, 2011) offers such an analysis, focusing 
on airline-market-level fares, and demonstrating that the magnitude of hub premium has declined over 
the recent years. Finally, studies of the effects of airline mergers tend to assess average system-wide 
effects of the consolidation events, paying relatively little regard to potentially important differences 
between groups of routes or origin airports. 
While addressing the implications of the hub-and-spoke networks, early post-deregulation studies of the 
airline industry focused on testing the market contestability hypothesis, which asserted that potential 
competition could put pressure on the exercise of market power by the incumbent carriers. Notable 
studies include Bailey and Panzar (1981); and Hurdle et al. (1989), which rejected the hypothesis that all 
city-pair markets are equally contestable, and found that the number of potential entrants had a 
significant negative effect on yields. 
 
Following establishment of hub-and-spoke networks, seemingly higher fares at concentrated hub 
airports turned researchers’ attention to the hub premium. The General Accounting Office’s (GAO) 
widely cited 1990 study was the first to quantify the hub premium when it found that yield for trips 
originating at dominated hub airports was 27.2 percent higher than yields at airports that were not 
concentrated in 1988.4  However, the GAO’s study was also criticized for implicitly assuming that trips 
taken from the two groups of airports were identical; not taking into account route distance, the 
number of plane changes, passenger mix, carrier identity, unit cost differences, and frequent flier 
programs. Similar analyses that controlled for some of these factors were carried out and found more 
modest levels for the hub premium.5 
 
                                                          
3 Van Dender (2007) offers a direct evaluation of the relationship between airport-level fares and airport-level 
airline concentration.  The study uses a simultaneous equation system approach to present an analysis of 
determinants of airport-level prices, delays, frequency of service, and operating revenues at 55 large US airports. 
Van Dender does not find any significant relationship between airport-level concentration and prices. Compared to 
this study, our analysis provides a more comprehensive coverage of the US airline industry with a longer panel; we 
also analyze price effects of the largest carrier’s market share and competition on routes originating at an airport. 
4 See General Accounting Office, Airline Competition, p. 3.  A filtered DB1A database was used, comparing 15 
dominated hub airports to a control group of 38 non-concentrated airports. 
5 U.S. Department of Transportation performed a similar analysis in 1990, where only routes of equal distance 
were compared between the two airport groups, and estimated an average hub premium of 18.7 percent and 8.9 
percent for airports dominated by one and two airlines, respectively. Morrison and Winston (1995) revised the 
GAO study controlling for the five factors mentioned above. They found a significantly lower hub premium of 5.2 
percent. In particular, corrections for distance and the number of plane changes reduced the estimated premium 
by 18.6 percentage points; carrier-specific comparisons shed off another 4.6 percentage points; correcting for FFPs 
and passenger mix removed each removed yet another 2.5 percentage points off the premium. Dresner and 
Windle (1992) controlled for distance and airport-level characteristics when comparing yields on flights from hubs 
to yields on flights to hubs.  The premise of the study was that flights from a hub would render higher yields than 
those to a hub since market power is more pertinent at the origin airport. Their results showed the existence of a 
small but significant hub premium. 
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Borenstein (1989) is regarded as the seminal econometric study examining the airport dominance 
premium. Airport dominance and route dominance were found to significantly affect the fares in 
markets where a carrier is dominant at the originating hub airport.  In a follow-up study, Borenstein 
(1991) showed that an airline with a dominant position at an airport has a larger share of the overall 
originating traffic, and thereby also has a larger share of any market originating at the dominated hub.6 
 
Subsequent research provided new evidence on the hub reliability premium issue: Evans and Kessides 
(1993) concluded that airport dominance is a far more important source of market power than route 
dominance.  Lee and Luengo-Prado (2005) found that the hub effect increases as the share of premium 
class passengers rises; the presence of a LCC reduces premium fares by as much as 6 percent, while 
reducing coach fares by as much as 14 percent. Overall, they suggested that much of the observed hub 
premium could be explained by the passenger mix.7  Bilotkach (2007) demonstrated that dominant 
carriers command the corresponding premiums on the international routes.  
 
Two studies documenting the impact of low-cost carriers are Morrison (2001) and Brueckner et al. 
(forthcoming). Morrison (2001) showed that actual and adjacent competition from this airline has saved 
passengers $12.9 billion in 1998.  Brueckner et al. (forthcoming) demonstrated that competition from 
the legacy carriers does not affect airfares, while competition from the low-cost airlines does. 
 
Following the wave of airline consolidations in the 1980's, Borenstein (1990) and Kim and Singal (1993) 
examined the price and market power effects of the 1980s wave of airline mergers. Clougherty (2002) 
suggested that US airline mergers improve the international competitiveness of US carriers. Richard 
(2003) looked at the welfare effects of a hypothetical merger between American Airlines and United 
Airlines for Chicago-originating routes, focusing on the carriers’ choice of prices and frequency. Kwoka 
and Shumilkina (2010) focused on effects of elimination of potential competition. Bilotkach (2011) 
examined the effects of changes in multimarket contact on the intensity of competition, effectively 
evaluating coordinated effects of that consolidation event. Most recently, Luo (2011) examined the 
effects of the Delta-Northwest merger, suggesting that this event resulted in a small increase in airfares 
at the market level (looking at both non-stop and connecting routes). Our study does not disagree with 
these findings; we however specifically point to those markets, where this merger could have resulted in 
increased airfares. We also suggest that any adverse effects of an airline merger could indeed be 
localized to smaller communities. 
 
  
                                                          
6 Fruhan (1972) was the first to address the underlying idea of this effect by showing that an airline with a large 
share of available route capacity would disproportionately attract more traffic on that route.  This route-based 
capacity advantage was also supported by Bailey, Graham, and Kaplan (1985) in their review of the deregulated 
industry.  They went on to show that the strong evidence that they found for route-based capacity advantage prior 
to deregulation had diminished by 1981.  Cilberto and Williams (2010) also showed that control of the airport’s 
resources appears to be an important source of the dominant carriers’ market power. 
7 On a similar note, Lederman (2008) found that frequent flier programs account for 25 to 37 percent of the hub 
premium that carriers charge. 
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III. Data 
 
Data for our research exercise come predominantly from Bureau of Transportation Statistics (BTS), a 
division of the US Department of Transportation (DOT). BTS collects information on airline operations 
and airfares in the US airline industry. Average airport-level airfares we will use as the dependent 
variable are computed by the DOT from the 10 per cent sample of actual itineraries. We use annual 
average airfares for seventeen years, from 1993 until 2009, making adjustment for inflation using 1993 
as the base year. Thus, our dependent variable represents annual average ticket price, in constant 
dollars, paid by a passenger departing from an airport. 
 
The majority of our independent variables are computed from the DOT’s T100 Segment databank. This 
dataset includes information about all commercial airline services departing from US airports. The 
information is provided monthly at the airline-origin-destination-aircraft type level (e.g., Delta Air Lines 
Boeing-757 services from Los Angeles International to New York John F. Kennedy airport in January of 
2000 are recorded separately from the Boeing-737 services of the same carrier on the same route in the 
same month) and includes the number of flights performed, seats provided, and passengers carried. We 
have aggregated the data at the annual level; and merged regional airlines with the respective major 
carriers.8 After this, we have computed the following variables from T100 dataset, at the airport-year 
level. 
Airport level Herfindhal-Hirschmann Index (HHI). HHI is the sum of squared market shares, across all the 
airlines at an airport. We have computed such index based on airlines’ passenger volumes. 
Highest market share. This variable represents the share of passengers, handled by the largest airline at 
an airport. This is effectively a one-firm concentration ratio. 
Route HHI. This variable is computed as the passenger-weighted average HHI on all non-stop routes 
originating at the airport. This serves as a measure of route dominance. We should however note that 
this is an imperfect measure of competition between the airlines. In particular, many smaller airports 
may only offer services to the major carriers’ hub; but some passengers originating at those smaller 
airports will continue their journeys beyond those hubs. Then, even if we find that all individual routes 
originating at an airport are monopolized; the airlines might still be competing on one-stop markets 
going through their hubs. 
The three variables above will be the key measures of market structure; impact of those variables on the 
mean airport-level price will be the focus of our research. The three measures are naturally correlated 
with each other. In particular, the correlation coefficient between HHI and highest market share is over 
0.9, whereas correlation between route HHI and the other measures of concentration is around 0.6. We 
will need to be mindful of these facts when interpreting the estimation results. 
                                                          
8 Some services, in particular on thinner routes, are delegated by the major carriers to regional airlines, typically 
using smaller jet and/or turboprop aircraft. Original T100 dataset codes regional airlines differently from the 
majors. Details on the procedure used to merge regionals with the majors are available from the authors upon 
request. 
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The following control variables have also been computed from T100 dataset. 
Total airport-level passenger volume. This variable will control for possible scale effects. 
Mean distance. This variable was calculated as the passenger-weighted mean distance of a non-stop 
flight from the airport. This distance clearly underestimates the total one-way distance in an average 
passenger’s itinerary. 
Market shares of individual airlines. Those have been computed for thirteen individual major carriers, 
some of which have not been in existence for the entire duration of our panel. The main purpose of 
these variables will be to account for possible price changes due to growth of low cost carriers (most 
importantly, Southwest Airlines and JetBlue Airways). See notes to Table 6 for more details. 
Other control variables we will use include population, average weekly wage, and unemployment rate. 
These variables are measured at the corresponding Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) level, and have 
been obtained from the US Census Bureau and the Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
Table 1 includes basic descriptive statistics of our variables. We present means and standard deviations 
for the entire sample, as well as for the three sub-samples we will focus on later in this study. To define 
sub-samples, we use the Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA) classification of airports. The FAA 
classifies airports as primary and non-primary, using 10,000 passenger boardings per year as the cut-off. 
For our analysis, we will only focus on primary airports, which are further subdivided into non-hub 
airports, small hubs, medium hubs, and large hubs based on the percentage of total passenger 
boardings handled by the airport. Specifically, non-hub airports are primary airports which handle less 
than 0.05% of total passenger traffic on the US market9; small hubs handle 0.05 to 0.25% of all 
passengers. In order to be classified as a medium hub, the airport needs to handle more than 0.25%, but 
less than 1% of all passengers. Finally, airports that handle over 1% of all passenger boardings in the US 
market are classified as large hubs. Note that some airports may change their classification over the 
years. Overall, there are 442 airports in our dataset, which are classified as primary in at least one year. 
Given the data analysis methodology we use, in particular utilization of lagged endogenous variables as 
instruments, 399 of those airports are actually included into our regressions. 
The following facts are apparent from the data. First, an average airport is rather concentrated. At the 
same time, smaller airports are much more concentrated than larger hubs. In all fairness, large hubs are 
more concentrated than medium hubs; however, average airport-level HHI for this group, at 0.35, is still 
half of the same for small hubs and non-hub airports. Airports’ largest carriers handle substantial share 
of passenger traffic, as evidenced by the average values of the highest market share variable. Note that 
the largest carriers at smaller airports tend to carry larger shares of passenger traffic as compared to the 
same for bigger gateways. Further, non-stop markets tend to be highly concentrated, with larger 
airports exhibiting more route-level competition. Last but not least, smaller airports tend to be located 
                                                          
9 To put this into perspective, 0.05% of total US domestic passenger traffic corresponds to about 300,000 
passengers per annum. 
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in less populous areas (which is hardly surprising in itself) with lower wages and higher rates of 
unemployment.  
The purpose of Figure 1 is to give the reader an idea of the behavior of our main variables over time. 
Observe that both airports and non-stop markets have exhibited the highest concentration in the 1990s. 
The dips in both HHIs and the highest market after 2001 can be attributed to a series of high-profile 
airline bankruptcies and reorganizations following the events of September 11, 2001. Specifically, United, 
Delta, Northwest, and US Airways spent some time under Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection, which 
resulted in downsizing and some hub closures. 10  At the same time, low-cost carriers, most notably 
Southwest Airlines, used temporary weakness of the legacy carriers to encroach on their territory (see 
Boguslaski, Ito, and Lee, 2004, for more details). JetBlue Airways has also been growing rapidly after 
being founded in 2001 (see Bilotkach, Hueschelrath, and Mueller (2012) for a discussion of JetBlue 
network development). 
IV. Hypotheses and Methodology 
The focus of our study will be on the relationship between airport-level prices, airport concentration, 
largest carrier’s market share, and concentration on routes originating at the airport. We clearly expect 
higher concentration and an increase in the dominant airline’s market share to increase the fares. The 
issue then is which of these three factors is a more important predictor of price level. We will also 
investigate whether sources of market power at the origin airport level differ across groups of airports. 
The two econometric problems we will need to tackle are airport-level heterogeneity and potential 
endogeneity of the three measures of market concentration. We have chosen conventional approaches 
to addressing these problems. Specifically, airport-related idiosyncrasies will be captured by the airport 
fixed effects model; and an instrumental variable approach will be employed to address the endogeneity 
concern. Lagged endogenous variables will be used as instruments in all specifications. Among the 
control variables, airport-level passenger volume is potentially endogenous; lagged passenger volume 
will be used as an instrument for this variable. Finally, standard errors we report are robust to both 
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation – our data structure clearly points to the threat of both unequal 
error variances across, and correlation of the current error with its past realizations within the cross-
sections. 
Before we proceed, we should note that our choice of methodology drives the interpretation of our 
coefficient estimates. Use of airport-level fixed effects – a logical choice given the dataset we have – 
implies that identification of our regression coefficients will be driven by the variation in variables within 
airports, not across them. For instance, our coefficient on airport-level HHI will tell us how the airport-
level price will respond to the increase in airport-level concentration within an airport over time, not 
whether more concentrated airports tend to be associated with higher average fares at any given point 
in time. The latter is an appropriate interpretation of the regression coefficient in a cross-section. As a 
side note, using a longer panel, we should be able to get sufficient within-airport variation in the key 
                                                          
10 US Airways dismantled Pittsburgh and Baltimore hubs; Delta pulled out of Dallas-Ft.Worth. 
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concentration measures to be able to identify the relationships we are looking for. We will return to this 
issue when discussing the estimation results. 
As described in the previous section, the control variables we will be using include total passenger 
volume, mean non-stop distance of a flight originating at an airport, airport-level market shares for the 
major players in the US airline industry, and three demographic measures for the corresponding 
metropolitan statistical area. In addition to these, we will also use year dummy variables to control for 
the corresponding heterogeneity. 
We will start by performing our analysis for the entire sample. After that, we will evaluate whether the 
concentration-price relationships differ across the airport groups. For this, we will first define three sub-
samples of airports, based on their relative size in the US aviation system (as classified by FAA). One sub-
sample will include large and medium hubs; the second sub-sample will contain small and medium hub 
airports; and the third sub-sample will include small hubs and primary non-hub airports. We have 
chosen not to conduct the analysis separately for large, medium, and small hubs, as each individual 
category includes rather few airports (37, 48, and 84, respectively). 11 You can see that most primary 
airports are, not surprisingly, classified in the non-hub category.  
For both the entire sample and each individual sub-sample, we will run six specifications, which will 
differ in terms of the combinations of the key concentration variables employed. We will begin by 
including only one of the three concentration measures into regression. Then, we will estimate 
specifications including two such measures – airport-level and route-level HHI; and highest market share 
and route-level HHI. Finally, a specification that includes all three concentration measures will be 
estimated. To enable interpretation of regression coefficients as respective elasticities, natural 
logarithms of all measures of concentration will be used. Other control variables, except for the airline 
market shares and year dummies, will be also included in logarithmic form. 
We should note that the correlation between airport-level HHI and largest carrier’s market share is very 
high in our sample. We can therefore expect that including both variables into the same specification 
might produce insignificant coefficients, even though both measures of concentration could be 
important determinants of airport-level prices. We should therefore be cautious when interpreting the 
corresponding estimation results. At the same time, lower correlation levels between route-level HHI 
and airport-level concentration measures give us more confidence to suggest that specification where 
both these variables are present are able to disentangle the corresponding effects. 
Research hypotheses with respect to our key variables are quite clear – higher concentration is expected 
to lead to higher average fares. Indeed, our aim is to see which of the measures, if any, are more robust 
predictors of airport-level airfares, other things equal. With respect to control variables, we expect 
higher total passenger volume to lower airfares, presumably due to scale effects; higher real weekly 
wages and population will be expected to lead to higher fares, whereas higher unemployment rate in 
the airport’s MSA should lower the level of fares going out of the airport. The three demographic 
                                                          
11 These represent counting of the airports, which fell into the said categories in at least one year. Due to the 
nature of the classification criterion used, airports can change their affiliation across the categories over time. 
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variables can be thought of as demand shifters. Higher average non-stop flight distance should increase 
average fares. Increases in market shares of the low cost carriers, such as Southwest Airlines or JetBlue 
Airways) will be expected to lower average airfares. 
V. Results and Discussion 
V.I. Estimation Results 
Results of our data analysis exercise are presented in the following tables. Table 2 reports results for the 
entire sample, or rather population of airports. Tables 3, 4, and 5 present estimation results for the 
three groups of airports we identified above. Results for large and medium hub airports are shown in 
Table 3, while Tables 4 and 5 depict results for medium and small hubs; and small hubs and non-hub 
primary airports, respectively. Finally, Table 6 reports results for the airline market share variables – 
these come from selected specifications from tables 2 through 512. Let us examine the results in the 
order they are presented. 
Results in Table 2 show airport-level concentration index as the most robust predictor of average 
airport-level airfares. This result is especially vivid for the passenger-based HHI. Numerically, a ten 
percent increase in the airport-level HHI leads to one percent increase in average airfares for flights 
departing from an airport; with one standard deviation increase in this measure of concentration 
associated with about 5% increase in average airfares. There is also some evidence to suggest that 
highest carrier’s market share at an airport could be associated with higher average prices paid by the 
traveling public. Here, a 10 percent increase in the dominant airline’s market share is associated with 
about 0.8% increase in average fare (from specification 5 in Table 2). 
Comparing results for different groupings of airports, we notice substantial differences across them. 
Results for large and medium hub airports suggest that competition on the routes going into and out of 
those airports is the most robust driver of airport-level airfares. Note also that statistical significance of 
both airport HHI and largest carrier’s market share vanishes when we include mean route HHI into our 
specifications. Numerically, our estimates suggest that one standard deviation increase in mean route 
HHI, holding other things constant, will be associated with 3.8-4.6% increase in mean airfare for flights 
originating at a given airport. Results for the group of medium and small hub airports suggest that 
changes in concentration at either the airport or the route level do not appear to affect airfares in this 
group. Further, the effect of the changes in the largest carrier’s market share is marginally significant 
and not robust. The magnitude of the effect is also not too impressive – one percent increase in airport 
level airfares would require about 17 percent increase in the share of the largest carrier at the airport. 
Results for the group of small hub and non-hub airports largely replicate the outcome observed for the 
entire sample, in terms of statistical significance and magnitude of the coefficients on key variables. To 
sum up results reported in Tables 2 through 5, we can say the following. While variation in airport-level 
HHI is the strongest predictor of changes in airport-level airfares; this result is predominantly driven by 
the smaller airports. For the large and medium hubs, route-level competition is the most robust 
predictor of average price. 
                                                          
12 The corresponding coefficients in other specifications are similar to those reported in Table 6. 
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Results in Table 6 generally confirm the conclusions outlined above. It is evident that effect of the 
highest market share is not robust to including other measures of concentration; route-level 
competition effect can be further narrowed down to large hubs; and airport-level HHI is still the 
strongest predictor of prices for the entire sample. Note that the magnitude of the price effect of 
airport-level HHI reported in Table 6 is higher than same found in Table 2. Specifically, looking at 
Specification 6 in Table 6, a 10 percent increase in HHI is associated with 1.8 percent increase in average 
airport-level airfares. Further, results in Table 6 suggest that the airport-concentration-price relationship 
is driven predominantly by non-hub airports, which is the omitted category in the corresponding 
regressions. 
There are no surprises present in the coefficients for control variables. It is true that statistical 
significance of most variables is patchy, and coefficient magnitudes are not stable across sub-samples; 
however, where variables are significant, the corresponding coefficients show the expected signs. 
Specifically, passenger volume exhibits evidence consistent with the scale effects (this result is also 
present in Van Dender, 2007); greater flight distance is associated with higher fares, even though we 
have indicated that distance of a non-stop flight underestimates the distance of an itinerary flown by a 
passenger commencing his/her trip at a given airport. Demographic variables also show expected 
behavior. There are no surprises in effects of the airline market shares either. Southwest Airlines’ 
market share shows the largest downward pressure on airfares, with some of the other low cost carriers 
(JetBlue and Frontier) also producing price reduction in some of the samples we analyzed. Evidence 
suggesting that Alaska Airlines and TWA could have exerted13 downward pressure on airport-level prices 
can be viewed as the only real surprise coming from control variables. Of the legacy carriers, American 
Airlines, Northwest Airlines, and US Airways appear to produce price increases as they expand their 
airport presence, other things equal. 
In summary, our results demonstrate the following. First, effects of airport-level concentration on 
airfares for trips originating at that airport depend on the airport size. Specifically, the relationship is the 
strongest in smaller airports; there is also some evidence suggesting airport concentration might affect 
fares in the largest airports. In mid-sized airports, however, concentration does not appear to affect 
average fares for trips originating at those gateways. Second, route-level concentration appears to be a 
robust predictor of airport-level fares at the larger airports. Third, the pure airport dominance effect (as 
proxied by the airport-level market share of the largest carrier) does not appear to be robust to 
including airport-level and/or route-level concentration measures into specifications. Coming back to 
our question of whether airfares will be higher at airports served by a few airlines competing on each 
market, or at the gateways served by many carriers, each being a monopolist on the respective route; it 
appears that the answer will also be different for large and small airports. At large airports, new entry 
(or reduced airport-level concentration) will only bring down the airfares if it also increases competition 
on individual routes. That is, only entry at those routes where the entrant competes with the incumbent 
will affect airport-level fares. In smaller airports, however, new entry will bring average fares down 
regardless of whether the new carrier comes in with new services, or competing with the incumbents. 
At the same time, only large-scale entry can appreciably change average route-level concentration in a 
                                                          
13 Note that neither of the two carriers survives for the entire duration of our sample. 
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large hub; whereas relatively small-scale entry might be sufficient to alter airport-level concentration in 
a non-hub airport. 
There are some potentially important issues that our analysis does not address. Most importantly, when 
it comes to measuring competition on routes originating at an airport, we only look at non-stop markets. 
It is however a well-known fact that airlines operating hub-and-spoke networks may compete for 
passengers on one-stop markets. Then, even though non-stop routes might not be competitive, airlines 
will compete for passengers on one-stop markets. Further, the airport-concentration-price relationship 
we observe might work through competition on one-stop markets; examining this relationship can be an 
interesting topic for a future project. Also, a quick look at Figure 1 shows that airline markets are rather 
concentrated at the non-stop level. On top of this, within-airport variation in the route-level 
concentration measure is not high, especially for the sub-sample of smaller airports. This leads us to 
suggest that there is a possibility that, despite the fact that we used a rather long panel, variation of 
route-level concentration within airports has simply not been sufficient for us to observe any 
appreciable effect of route-level competition on airport-level airfares in the panel data setting. To put 
things into clearer perspective, consider this fact. Average coefficient of variation for within-airport 
route-level concentration in our data is a bit more than eight percent. 14  The same measure for 
passenger-based airport-level HHI is close to sixty percent. Thus, there is simply more within-variation in 
airport-level concentration than in the route concentration to enable potential identification of the 
corresponding effects. At the same time, the facts above make it even more remarkable that we have 
been able to observe a strong effect of route-level competition on airfares in the sub-set of larger 
airports. 
Application – Delta/Northwest and United/Continental Mergers 
Our data analysis results may have interesting implications for the analysis of airline consolidation. 
Three high-profile mergers occurred in the US airline industry over the last five years. In 2008 Delta Air 
Lines acquired Northwest Airlines, in 2010 Continental Airlines and United Airlines merged, keeping the 
latter carrier’s name and redesigning their logo to reflect legacy of both merger partners. The former 
merger was approved largely thanks to the partner airlines’ complementary networks. A United Airlines 
study also demonstrated that the extent of route-level competition between the legacy carriers did not 
considerably affect market-level airfares (Brueckner, Lee, and Singer, forthcoming, is based on this 
study). Last but not least, in 2011 Southwest Airlines bought AirTran – a fellow low cost carrier based in 
Atlanta. 
It is generally true that individual non-stop routes in the US airline industry are quite concentrated – our 
data clearly demonstrates this. Such high concentration at the route level is related predominantly to 
the fact that most airlines operate hub-and-spoke networks, thus many if not most of the non-stop 
flights out of smaller airports link these airports with the respective airlines’ hubs. Then, while recent 
mergers have not affected the extent of non-stop competition on most routes – except for markets 
connecting the merger partners’ hub airports – competition on one-stop markets has probably 
                                                          
14 We computed coefficients of variation for this variable for each individual airport, and then calculated a simple 
non-weighted average of these coefficients. 
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decreased. Another likely outcome of the airline mergers is increased concentration at the airport level, 
especially at smaller airports served by many of the major carriers to feed passenger traffic to the 
respective airlines’ hubs. Our results demonstrate a clear relationship between airport level 
concentration and average fares for trips originating at small hubs and non-hub airports. In this sub-
section, we will try to quantify the consumer welfare implications of the Delta – Northwest and United – 
Continental mergers, suggested by our estimation results. 
To evaluate the projected changes in airport-level concentration, we have taken the corresponding data 
(airport-level passenger-based HHI and merger partners’ airport-level market shares) for 2007 in the 
case of Delta-Northwest and 2009 for the United-Continental merger. We assumed, quite naively, 
admittedly, that the post-merger airport-level market share would be equal to the sum of the partners’ 
pre-merger numbers, everything else being equal. Then, the change in the HHI as a result of the merger 
would be computed as: 
∆𝐻𝐻𝐼 = 2𝑆𝑖𝑆𝑗 
Where 𝑆𝑖 and 𝑆𝑗 are the partner airlines’ pre-merger market shares.
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We have then proceeded to identify the airports, where a merger would result in a five or higher 
percent increase in passenger-based airport-level HHI. 16 For the Delta-Northwest merger, 54 such 
airports have been identified. Interestingly, the corresponding number for the Continental-United 
consolidation event was only 14. Further, we have identified six airports (Boston Logan, Los Angeles 
International, Orlando, New Orleans, Hayden, CO, and Harrisburg, PA), which were projected to 
experience more than five percent increase in HHI as a result of each of the two mergers. 
Our analysis will be based on the premise that airport-level HHI was found to be a significant 
determinant of airport-level fares only for those gateways which were classified as small hubs or non-
hub primary airports, according to the share of total US domestic traffic handled. This consideration 
effectively made us lose interest in studying the effects of Continental-United merger, as of the fourteen 
airports which we identified as candidates for increased concentration level following the event, only 
three belonged to this category. Also, projected average price increase following the merger for flights 
originating at those airports was only between 0.8 and 1.4 percent. 
Effects of the Delta – Northwest merger, however, warranted further investigation, as we determined 
that 32 small hub and non-hub airports, handling nearly 20 million passengers in total in 2007 (this 
corresponds to about 3 percent of the total domestic US passenger traffic in that year), would become 
significantly more concentrated after this merger. As can be seen from Table 8, nine of those small 
airports were projected to experience 50 percent or higher increase in HHI, which would, according to 
our estimates, translate in price increases of up to eleven percent for trips originating at those gateways. 
                                                          
15 Without loss of generality, assume airlines 1 and 2 of N present on the market merge. Then, pre-merger HHI can 
be written as 𝐻𝐻𝐼0 = 𝑆1
2 + 𝑆2
2 + ∑ 𝑆𝑖
2𝑁
𝑖=3 ; whereas post-merger HHI is 𝐻𝐻𝐼1 = (𝑆1 + 𝑆2)
2 + ∑ 𝑆𝑖
2𝑁
𝑖=3 ; the 
subsequent algebra is trivial. 
16 Five percent increase in airport-level HHI would correspond to about 0.5 percent increase in average airfare. 
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To evaluate the projected percentage changes in price levels corresponding to the projected post-
merger change in HHI, we used the corresponding regression coefficients from specifications (4) and (6) 
in Table 5 (recall that this is the table which reported results for the sub-sample of small hub and non-
hub airports). Then, assuming a unitary price elasticity of demand for air travel (according to Brons et al., 
2002, unitary price elasticity lies in the middle of the range of values for price elasticity of demand for air 
travel, as reported by various studies), change in consumer surplus can be approximated through17: 
∆𝐶𝑆 = 𝑄0𝑃0(%∆𝑃)(1 − 0.5(%∆𝑃)) 
Where 𝑄0 and 𝑃0 correspond to pre-merger passenger volume and average price, taken directly from 
our dataset. The term %∆𝑃  denotes percentage change in price, computed by multiplying the 
corresponding elasticity estimate from the regression results by the projected change in airport-level 
HHI. 
Table 8 reports our estimates of consumer welfare losses following the Delta – Northwest merger for 
each of the 32 small airports, which were projected to experience more than 5 percent increase in the 
value of the airport-level concentration measure (passenger based HHI). Over these 32 airports, we 
discover consumer welfare losses totaling about one quarter of a billion dollars per year. In all honesty, 
this number should be halved, as the effect we observed applies to trips originating at an airport. Then, 
it is reasonable to assume that half of the passenger traffic reported in Table 7 corresponds to 
passengers originating at a given airport; whereas the other half are passengers whose trips originated 
elsewhere. We can also safely assume that connecting traffic at the airports listed in Table 7 is minimal if 
at all existent. 
The figure for consumer welfare loss we have come up with, while in hundreds of millions dollars per 
year, appears miniscule if put into context of the multi-billion-dollar US airline industry. According to the 
US Department of Transportation, total operating revenue of US airlines on the US domestic market in 
2007 amounted to nearly $130 billion dollars. This means that the welfare loss we computed 
corresponds to about one tenth of one percent of the US airlines’ total annual revenue. Our results, 
however, suggest that adverse effects of the merger might be concentrated in a handful of metropolitan 
areas rather than being dispersed across the entire US domestic airline industry. In fact, on average a 
traveler starting her journey from either of the 32 small airports expected to experience price increases 
as a result of the merger, is expected to experience a nearly $13 welfare loss following the consolidation 
event, following an expected $13.29 passenger weighted average increase in airfare for travel 
originating at those airports. Price changes and per traveler welfare losses of this magnitude, occurring 
across the whole airline industry, would probably make front page headlines. 
Of course, our estimate of consumer welfare effects of the Delta-Northwest merger across a number of 
small airports is naïve and does not take account of possible changes in the airlines’ conduct post-
merger, as well as of generally increased degree of price competition in the industry in the recent years 
– see Berry and Jia (2010). Peters (2006) also shows that naïve approaches to merger simulations did not 
                                                          
17 This calculation assumes demand relationship is linear or near linear, and that demand curve itself does not shift 
following the merger. 
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yield satisfactory results when applied to a series of 1980s airline consolidation events. Indeed, following 
a merger, we could see overall reduction in frequency by the merged airline, along with entry or 
expansion by other carriers, which would suggest that we might have over-estimated the projected 
increases in airport-level HHIs. Further, we have effectively assumed that any potential efficiency gains 
due to the merger would not be passed along to the passengers. Future studies might be able to 
elaborate upon these points. 
Despite all the potential problems we have outlined above, we can say that our research contributes to 
understanding effects of consolidation in the airline industry by pointing out the possibility of unequal 
distribution of gains and losses due to mergers. Specifically, our findings imply that consumer welfare 
losses might be concentrated in smaller communities, and may be related to increased concentration at 
the respective airports, even where competition on individual non-stop routes might not be affected by 
the consolidation event. An interesting question for further study is whether increased airport-level 
concentration leads to higher fares for trips originating at an airport via decreased competition on one-
stop markets. 
Conclusions 
Our study differs from most papers examining pricing in the airline industry in one important way. 
Instead of looking at prices at the airline-route level, we examine determinants of an average airfare for 
trips originating at an airport. From the literature on pricing in the airline industry, we can identify at 
least four possible drivers of airport-concentration – airport-level airfare relationship, which are largely 
independent of the non-stop route-level competition between airlines. First, airlines operating hub-and-
spoke networks will inevitably compete on one-stop routes that originate at the airport, flying 
passengers to the same destinations via different hubs. Second, airlines enjoying a dominant position at 
an airport can influence airport’s decision making, including blocking further entry. Third, an airline’s 
entry into an airport can be construed by incumbent carriers as a competitive threat, affecting fares on 
routes not directly served by the entrant. Finally, we can expect airlines at less concentrated airports to 
compete more aggressively for frequent fliers residing in the airport’s catchment area. 
Examining price setting at the airport level allows us to explore whether and to what degree airport-
level concentration, competition on routes originating at an airport, and the largest carrier’s market 
share will affect the airfare an average passenger will pay. We also take a comprehensive look at the US 
airline industry, examining price setting at both large and smaller airports – in this way, we differ from 
many studies which choose to focus on larger airports and/or denser markets. 
Overall, our results demonstrate the following. First, effects of airport-level concentration on airfares for 
trips originating at an airport depend on the airport size. Specifically, the relationship is the strongest in 
smaller airports; there is also some evidence suggesting airport concentration might affect fares in the 
largest airports. In mid-sized airports, however, concentration does not appear to affect average fares 
for trips originating at those gateways. Second, route-level concentration appears to be a robust 
predictor of airport-level fares at the larger airports. Third, pure airport dominance effect (as proxied by 
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the airport-level market share of the largest carrier) does not appear to be robust enough to including 
airport-level and/or route-level concentration measures into specifications. 
Our study leaves a number of important questions open. First, while we list potential reasons behind the 
airport-concentration-price relationship; we do not approach the question of which of these reasons 
is/are responsible for the result we obtained. Addressing this issue would require access to more 
detailed data on competition on one-stop markets; airport-airline relationships; and frequent flier 
program membership, among other things. Second, we only look at average fares for trips originating at 
an airport. Whereas previous studies have demonstrated that, for instance, magnitude of the airport 
dominance premium can differ at the upper end of the price distribution, as price insensitive travelers 
typically tend to be more frequent fliers, who value their preferred airline’s frequent flier program more. 
Third, some of the results, as we indicated above, can be related to and potentially even driven by the 
extent of within variation in the key concentration measures. For example, route competition may have 
an effect on prices at both larger and smaller airports; however, the limited within variation in the 
extent of such competition at smaller gateways might have led us to conclude that such an effect is not 
statistically significant. 
The take-away message from our study is that sources of market power appear to be different for trips 
originating at airports of different size. Also, consolidation currently being observed in the US airline 
industry can have different effects on travelers living near larger and smaller airports, which means 
estimates of industry-wide effects of changes in competitive environment in the US airline industry 
should be taken with an understanding that gains and losses might not be distributed equally. In 
particular, our analysis points to a number of small communities which may end up with non-trivial 
consumer welfare losses following recent mergers. 
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Table 1 Descriptive statistics 
 All airports 
Large and medium 
hubs 
Medium and small 
hubs 
Small hubs and non-
hub 
Real airfare 
(year 1993 dollars) 
323.20 
(129.68) 
247.61 
(67.17) 
280.54 
(85.35) 
350.56 
(139.95) 
Passenger HHI 
0.6134 
(0.3146) 
0.3137 
(0.1920) 
0.3481 
(0.1836) 
0.74450 
(0.2716) 
Highest market 
share 
0.6775 
(0.2775) 
0.4446 
(0.1942) 
0.4347 
(0.1989) 
0.7878 
(0.2375) 
Route HHI 
0.9257 
(0.0819) 
0.8502 
(0.0569) 
0.8930 
(0.0604) 
0.9515 
(0.0770) 
Total passenger 
volume 
1,783,273 
(4,302,732) 
7,520,611 
(6,666,942) 
654,037 
(334,820) 
60,225 
(75,698) 
Mean distance, 
miles one-way 
411.80 
(396.18) 
880.84 
(453.91) 
460.35 
(230.31) 
285.21 
(310.67) 
Real wage, constant 
$/week 
483.56 
(102.69) 
589.67 
(108.84) 
499.19 
(77.69) 
451.43 
(84.41) 
Population, MSA 
level 
1,006,101 
(2,634,735) 
3,663,681 
(4,160,709) 
1,235,492 
(3,385,086) 
238,378 
(783,881) 
Unemployment rate, 
percent 
5.43 
(2.50) 
5.00 
(1.70) 
5.17 
(2.25) 
5.62 
(2.71) 
Note: this table includes mean values, with standard deviations in parentheses. Only data for primary 
airports (those handling over 10,000 passengers per year) are used in calculations. We use FAA airport 
classification, as described in this section of the paper. We have a total of 442 unique airports that are 
classified as primary at least once. 
 
 
Figure 1 Dynamics of Concentration Measures
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Table 2 Results for all airports 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Constant 
2.4821* 
(1.3800) 
2.7363** 
(1.3843) 
2.5232* 
(1.3447) 
2.4483* 
(1.3562) 
2.5363* 
(1.3585) 
2.4010* 
(1.3604) 
Airport HHI 
0.1110** 
(0.0339) 
--- --- 
0.0950* 
(0.0487) 
--- 
0.1177** 
(0.0543) 
Highest Market 
Share 
--- 
0.0868** 
(0.0301) 
--- --- 
0.0618 
(0.0457) 
-0.0317 
(0.0446) 
Mean Route HHI --- --- 
0.5146 
(0.3144) 
0.2042 
(0.4107) 
0.3195 
(0.4143) 
0.2360 
(0.4228) 
Total passenger 
volume 
-0.0529 
(0.0332) 
-0.0632** 
(0.0314) 
-0.0672** 
(0.0296) 
-0.0535 
(0.0334) 
-0.0562* 
(0.0305) 
-0.0526 
(0.0335) 
Mean distance 
0.0213 
(0.0468) 
0.0160 
(0.0472) 
0.0051 
(0.0471) 
0.0180 
(0.0479) 
0.0126 
(0.0484) 
0.0176 
(0.0479) 
Real wage 
0.1789 
(0.1271) 
0.1814 
(0.1259) 
0.2006 
(0.1244) 
0.1766 
(0.1275) 
0.1702 
(0.1273) 
0.1776 
(0.1278) 
Population 
0.2483** 
(0.1216) 
0.2354* 
(0.1217) 
0.2493** 
(0.1178) 
0.2534** 
(0.1203) 
0.2544** 
(0.1205) 
0.2556** 
(0.1205) 
Unemployment 
rate 
-0.2420** 
(0.0550) 
-0.2348** 
(0.0549) 
-0.2200** 
(0.0585) 
-0.2534** 
(0.0600) 
-0.2255** 
(0.0593) 
-0.2360** 
(0.0597) 
Adjusted R-
squared 
0.7657 0.7659 0.7644 0.7654 0.7666 0.7654 
Notes: 
1. Method used – airport-level fixed effects two-stage GLS. One-year lags are used as instruments 
for HHI, highest market share, route HHI, and passenger volume. 
2. All specifications use natural logarithms of all independent variables reported here, except for 
constant.  
3. Standard errors, robust to heteroscedasticity across and autocorrelation within cross-sections, 
are reported in parentheses. 
4. Airport-level airline market shares and year dummy variables are included in all specifications, 
but not reported. 
5. Included observations: 4771. 
6. Significance: * - 10%; ** - 5%  
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Table 3 Results for large and medium hub airports 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Constant 
1.8832 
(2.7893) 
1.3319 
(0.1014) 
2.3037 
(2.3580) 
2.5415 
(2.5819) 
2.3324 
(2.5614) 
2.5253 
(2.4781) 
Airport HHI 
0.1125** 
(0.0440) 
--- --- 
0.0509 
(0.0460) 
--- 
0.0469 
(0.1079) 
Highest Market 
Share 
--- 
0.1014** 
(0.0451) 
--- --- 
0.0391 
(0.0405) 
0.0045 
(0.0964) 
Mean Route 
HHI 
--- --- 
0.8124** 
(0.3336) 
0.6701* 
(0.3421) 
0.7108** 
(0.3294) 
0.6694** 
(0.3399) 
Total passenger 
volume 
-0.2042** 
(0.0623) 
-0.1941** 
(0.0650) 
-0.1500** 
(0.0662) 
-0.1664** 
(0.0632) 
-0.1588** 
(0.0651) 
-0.1663** 
(0.0632) 
Mean distance 
0.5798** 
(0.1246) 
0.5750** 
(0.1267) 
0.5729** 
(0.1167) 
0.5770** 
(0.1213) 
0.5756** 
(0.1220) 
0.5767** 
(0.1225) 
Real wage 
-0.2299 
(0.1820) 
-0.2180 
(0.1855) 
-0.1908 
(0.1830) 
-0.2440 
(0.1844) 
-0.2397 
(0.1863) 
-0.2436 
(0.1836) 
Population 
0.3279** 
(0.1585) 
0.3475** 
(0.1557) 
0.2223 
(0.1433) 
0.2476 
(0.1520) 
0.2505* 
(0.1476) 
0.2485* 
(0.1479) 
Unemployment 
rate 
-0.1483** 
(0.0585) 
-0.1468** 
(0.0563) 
-0.1126** 
(0.0505) 
-0.1147** 
(0.0516) 
-0.1123** 
(0.0525) 
-0.1146** 
(0.0507) 
Adjusted R-
squared 
0.8893 0.8887 0.8871 0.8911 0.8907 0.8910 
Notes: 
1. Method used – airport-level fixed effects two-stage GLS. One-year lags are used as instruments 
for HHI, highest market share, route HHI, and passenger volume. 
2. Reported results are for sub-sample of airports handling more than 0.25% of all passenger 
boardings within the US in a given year. 
3. All specifications use natural logarithms of all independent variables reported here, except for 
constant.  
4. Standard errors, robust to heteroscedasticity across and autocorrelation within cross-sections, 
are reported in parentheses. 
5. Airport-level airline market shares and year dummy variables are included in all specifications, 
but not reported. 
6. Included observations: 1029. 
7. Significance: * - 10%; ** - 5% 
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Table 4 Results for medium and small hub airports 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Constant 
-1.7429 
(2.2972) 
-1.7900 
(2.3045) 
-1.5837 
(2.2521) 
-1.4932 
(2.3384) 
-1.5487 
(2.3432) 
-1.5509 
(2.3490) 
Airport HHI 
0.0524 
(0.0449) 
--- --- 
0.0297 
(0.0563) 
--- 
-0.0154 
(0.0793) 
Highest Market 
Share 
--- 
0.0580* 
(0.0299) 
--- --- 
0.0397 
(0.0365) 
0.0494 
(0.0483) 
Mean Route 
HHI 
--- --- 
0.4931 
(0.5138) 
0.4303 
(0.5796) 
0.3920 
(0.5678) 
0.3991 
(0.5790) 
Total passenger 
volume 
-0.3748** 
(0.0524) 
-0.3817** 
(0.0521) 
-0.3627** 
(0.0488) 
-0.3621** 
(0.0478) 
-0.3678** 
(0.0480) 
-0.3690** 
(0.5790) 
Mean distance 
0.4082** 
(0.0720) 
0.4109** 
(0.0711) 
0.4100** 
(0.0725) 
0.4108** 
(0.0723) 
0.4131** 
(0.0717) 
0.4126** 
(0.0714) 
Real wage 
0.5620** 
(0.2083) 
0.5590** 
(0.2062) 
0.5837** 
(0.2100) 
0.5475** 
(0.2090) 
0.5457** 
(0.2076) 
0.5464** 
(0.2074) 
Population 
0.5087** 
(0.1598) 
0.5180** 
(0.1628) 
0.4705** 
(0.1514) 
0.4818** 
(0.1599) 
0.4910** 
(0.1623) 
0.4915** 
(0.1632) 
Unemployment 
rate 
-0.2519** 
(0.0508) 
-0.2469** 
(0.0502) 
-0.2305** 
(0.0383) 
-0.2331** 
(0.0373) 
-0.2314** 
(0.0381) 
-0.2303** 
(0.0363) 
Adjusted R-
squared 
0.9082 0.9089 0.9078 0.9088 0.9093 0.9093 
Notes: 
1. Method used – airport-level fixed effects two-stage GLS. One-year lags are used as instruments 
for HHI, highest market share, route HHI, and passenger volume. 
2. Reported results are for sub-sample of airports handling between 0.05% and 0.25% of all 
passenger boardings within the US in a given year. 
3. All specifications use natural logarithms of all independent variables reported here, except for 
constant.  
4. Standard errors, robust to heteroscedasticity across and autocorrelation within cross-sections, 
are reported in parentheses. 
5. Airport-level airline market shares and year dummy variables are included in all specifications, 
but not reported. 
6. Included observations: 1457. 
7. Significance: * - 10%; ** - 5%  
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Table 5 Results for small hub and non-hub airports  
 (1) (5) (4) (2) (6) (3) 
Constant 
3.0762** 
(1.4436) 
3.4657** 
(1.4136) 
3.6000** 
(1.3888) 
3.0923** 
(1.4432) 
3.4507** 
(1.4127) 
3.0568** 
(1.4438) 
HHI 
0.1121** 
(0.0397) 
--- 
--- 
0.1176* 
(0.0647) 
--- 0.1408** 
(0.0626) 
Highest Market 
Share 
--- 0.0818** 
(0.0341) 
--- --- 
0.0784 
(0.0651) 
-0.0358 
(0.0541) 
Mean Route 
HHI 
--- --- 0.3353 
(0.4337) 
-0.0731 
(0.6015) 
0.0411 
(0.6307) 
-0.0185 
(0.6482) 
Total passenger 
volume 
-0.0424 
(0.0360) 
-0.0546 
(0.0332) 
-0.0596* 
(0.0309) 
-0.0423 
(0.0361) 
-0.0544* 
(0.0326) 
-0.0413 
(0.0362) 
Mean distance 
-0.0053 
(0.0460) 
-0.0114 
(0.0464) 
-0.0208 
(0.0458) 
-0.0043 
(0.0476) 
-0.0119 
(0.0481) 
-0.0050 
(0.0477) 
Real wage 
0.2260 
(0.15523) 
0.2349 
(0.1526) 
0.2228 
(0.1523) 
0.2298 
(0.1582) 
0.2326 
(0.1559) 
0.2262 
(0.1585) 
Population 
0.1910 
(0.1421) 
0.1647 
(0.1404) 
0.1667 
(0.1415) 
0.1874 
(0.1453) 
0.1671 
(0.1445) 
0.1918 
(0.1460) 
Unemployment 
rate 
-0.2531** 
(0.0643) 
-0.2451** 
(0.0639) 
-0.2417** 
(0.0691) 
-0.2553** 
(0.0706) 
-0.2442** 
(0.0690) 
-0.2571** 
(0.0699) 
Adjusted R-
squared 
0.7380 0.7386 0.7378 0.7378 0.7385 0.7378 
Notes: 
1. Method used – airport-level fixed effects two-stage GLS. One-year lags are used as instruments 
for HHI, highest market share, route HHI, and passenger volume. 
2. Reported results are for sub-sample of primary airports handling less than 0.05% of all 
passenger boardings within the US in a given year. 
3. All specifications use natural logarithms of all independent variables reported here, except for 
constant.  
4. Standard errors, robust to heteroscedasticity across and autocorrelation within cross-sections, 
are reported in parentheses. 
5. Airport-level airline market shares and year dummy variables are included in all specifications, 
but not reported. 
6. Included observations: 3742. 
7. Significance: * - 10%; ** - 5% 
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Table 6 Individual airline market share effects 
 All airports 
Large and medium 
hubs 
Medium and small 
hubs 
Small hubs and non-
hub 
American Airlines 
0.2889** 
(0.1046) 
-0.0946 
(0.4844) 
0.5332** 
(0.2224) 
0.3614** 
(0.1004) 
Alaska Airlines 
-0.2577** 
(0.0562) 
-0.2353 
(0.5575) 
-0.1356** 
(0.0586) 
-0.2373** 
(0.0559) 
JetBlue Airways 
-0.4721** 
(0.2343) 
-0.8607 
(0.5770) 
-1.1475** 
(0.5303) 
-0.3374 
(0.2196) 
Continental Airlines 
0.0592 
(0.1025) 
0.4896 
(0.5546) 
0.1856 
(0.1614) 
-0.0082 
(0.0931) 
Delta Air Lines 
0.1145 
(0.0833) 
-0.7058 
(0.5722) 
-0.0882 
(0.2111) 
0.1299 
(0.0878) 
Frontier Airlines 
0.0636 
(0.1355) 
-0.8154** 
(0.3087) 
-0.0262 
(0.2204) 
0.0849 
(0.1375) 
Air Tran Airways 
0.0457 
(0.1625) 
-0.0544 
(0.2857) 
0.0262 
(0.2698) 
-0.0301 
(0.1534) 
America West 
Airlines 
-0.0134 
(0.1503) 
0.6469 
(0.4642) 
-0.0425 
(0.2302) 
-0.0915 
(0.1259) 
Northwest Airlines 
0.0414 
(0.11105) 
1.5827* 
(0.8078) 
0.6636** 
(0.2601) 
-0.0423 
(0.0992) 
TWA 
0.1462 
(0.1088) 
-1.2833** 
(0.5699) 
0.3257 
(0.2058) 
0.1038 
(0.1056) 
United Airlines 
-0.0210 
(0.1568) 
-0.2956 
(0.4564) 
-0.1226 
(0.2815) 
0.0137 
(0.1590) 
US Airways 
0.3234** 
(0.0808) 
1.5107** 
(0.5487) 
1.2218** 
(0.2318) 
0.2683** 
(0.0737) 
Southwest Airlines 
-1.2077** 
(0.2585) 
-2.8615** 
(0.5344) 
-1.4250** 
(0.3803) 
-0.7446** 
(0.2085) 
Notes: 
1. This table reports coefficients for airline market share variables from regression (4) in Tables 2, 3, 
4, and 5, respectively. 
2. Prior to 1997 merger of Valujet Airlines with Airtran Airways, Airtran’s market share corresponds 
to Valujet’s, as it has been computed using the carrier’s IATA code FL. 
3. Some carriers were not present in the data for the entire duration of our panel. In particular: 
a. JetBlue Airways was founded in 2001. 
b. Frontier Airlines was founded in 1994. 
c. America West Airlines merged with US Airways in 2005. 
d. Northwest Airlines merged with Delta Air Lines in 2008. 
e. TWA merged with American Airlines in 2000. 
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Table 7 Welfare effects of Delta – Northwest merger in small hubs and non-hub airports 
Airport 
Code 
Percentage 
change in 
airport HHI 
Percentage 
change in 
price, low 
limit 
Price 
change, 
high limit 
Passenger 
enplanements, 
2007 
Average 
airfares, year 
2007 prices 
Consumer 
welfare 
loss, low 
limit 
Consumer 
welfare loss, 
high limit 
AVP 41.16 4.61 5.79 220,190 421.14 4,180,384 5,218,903 
AZO 13.17 1.47 1.85 189,276 471.01 1,306,496 1,637,863 
BIS 55.61 6.23 7.83 183,787 455.54 5,057,026 6,299,410 
CID 6.86 0.76 0.96 531,864 406.69 1,659,008 2,081,688 
DLH 79.46 8.90 11.18 175,429 416.42 6,218,046 7,716,783 
FAR 44.21 4.95 6.22 303,563 492.84 7,231,577 9,023,921 
FCA 6.36 0.71 0.89 196,839 532.74 745,885 935,989 
FNT 32.13 3.60 4.52 534,774 281.36 5,322,480 6,653,757 
FSD 48.20 5.40 6.78 399,533 433.12 9,099,383 11,347,757 
GFK 63.43 7.11 8.93 85,196 564.55 3,298,524 4,103,914 
GTF 10.25 1.14 1.44 190,203 489.11 1,062,939 1,333,099 
HDN 8.88 0.99 1.25 139,573 475.21 657,079 824,248 
LAN 76.17 8.53 10.72 257,893 364.39 7,682,117 9,538,725 
LSE 63.11 7.07 8.88 123,753 465.38 3,930,880 4,890,910 
MBS 68.23 7.64 9.60 187,290 441.07 6,076,868 7,554,972 
RAP 12.61 1.41 1.77 239,642 476.61 1,603,599 2,010,483 
RST 33.20 3.72 4.67 166,853 378.20 2,305,276 2,881,418 
TVC 64.08 7.18 9.02 202,330 479.08 6,713,259 8,351,569 
ALB 8.15 0.91 1.14 1,423,672 337.41 4,371,882 5,484,720 
BHM 5.51 0.61 0.77 1,810,455 336.62 3,758,685 4,717,239 
BTR 26.28 2.94 3.70 485,765 412.80 5,822,431 7,285,096 
DSM 8.42 0.94 1.18 969,290 394.75 3,594,787 4,509,647 
GPT 22.76 2.55 3.20 452,485 362.06 4,128,078 5,167,795 
GRB 68.91 7.72 9.70 447,344 401.46 13,337,443 16,579,804 
GRR 69.24 7.76 9.74 1,001,098 420.67 31,420,924 39,057,373 
MDT 10.31 1.15 1.45 644,469 433.27 3,209,172 4,024,789 
MSN 38.23 4.28 5.38 789,832 424.99 14,078,715 17,584,023 
PWM 9.78 1.09 1.37 819,997 367.71 3,290,537 4,127,148 
ROC 10.53 1.18 1.48 1,428,543 304.50 5,105,448 6,402,803 
SRQ 9.24 1.03 1.30 775,056 288.80 2,307,731 2,894,694 
SYR 22.74 2.54 3.20 1,184,155 359.16 10,706,240 13,402,807 
VPS 66.09 7.40 9.30 381,477 547.21 14,894,541 18,523,587 
Total consumer welfare loss 194,177,450 242,166,950 
Note: we only include airports, for which projected increase in HHI following the merger was higher than 
5% from the pre-merger level. Estimates of consumer welfare loss are based on passenger HHI 
coefficient from Table 5, specifications (4) and (6) for low and high limit, respectively. Unitary demand 
elasticity is assumed in all calculations. Locations of airports listed in Appendix. 
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Appendix – List of Airports Affected by Delta-Northwest Merger 
Airport Code Location 
AVP Scranton, Pennsylvania 
AZO Kalamazoo, Michigan 
BIS Bismarck, North Dakota  
CID Cedar Rapids, Iowa 
DLH Duluth, Minnesota 
FAR Fargo, North Dakota 
FCA Glacier Park, Montana 
FNT Flint, Michigan 
FSD Sioux Falls, South Dakota 
GFK Grand Forks, North Dakota 
GTF Great Falls, Montana 
HDN Hayden, Colorado 
LAN Lansing, Michigan 
LSE La Crosse, Wisconsin 
MBS Saginaw, Michigan 
RAP Rapid City, South Dakota 
RST Rochester, Minnesota 
TVC Traverse City, Michigan 
ALB Albany, New York 
BHM Birmingham, Alabama 
BTR Baton Rouge, Louisiana 
DSM Des Moines, Iowa 
GPT Gulfport-Biloxi, Mississippi 
GRB Green Bay, Wisconsin 
GRR Grand Rapids, Michigan 
MDT Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 
MSN Madison, Wisconsin 
PWM Portland, Maine 
ROC Rochester, New York 
SRQ Sarasota, Florida 
SYR Syracuse, New York 
VPS Fort Walton Beach, Florida 
 
